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OPINION OF THE COURT
_______
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Wilfred Johnson, a citizen of Guyana, petitions 
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) affirming the decision by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
to deny his application for cancellation of removal under §
240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(2).  We will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
BACKGROUND
Johnson is a native and citizen of Guyana who entered the
United States in or about March 1995, without inspection.  In
February 2003, Johnson married a United States citizen, with
whom he has two young children.  Johnson’s wife filed and
obtained approval of an Alien Relative Petition, which permitted
his presence in the United States.
After briefly returning to Guyana, Johnson returned and
was paroled into the United States in July 2005 as an applicant
for legal permanent residence.  However, by March 2006,
Johnson’s marriage began to deteriorate and he left the marital
home.  Meanwhile, Johnson’s wife withdrew the Alien Relative
Petition, commenced divorce proceedings, and obtained a
1 Section 1229b(b)(2), titled the “Special rule for battered
spouse or child,” allows the Attorney General to cancel removal of
a deportable alien if the alien meets five threshold requirements:
(i) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a United States
citizen . . . ;
(ii) the alien has been physically present in the United States
for a continuous period of not less than 3 years immediately
preceding the date of such application . . . ;
(iii) the alien has been a person of good moral character
during such period . . . ;
(iv) the alien is not inadmissible under paragraph (2) or (3)
of section 1182(a) of this title, is not deportable under
paragraphs (1)(G) or (2) through (4) of section 1227(a) of
this title, subject to paragraph (5), and has not been
convicted of an aggravated felony; and
(v) the removal would result in extreme hardship to the
3
restraining order preventing Johnson from visiting his young
children.
Based on the allegations made by Johnson’s wife in
obtaining the restraining order, he was taken into custody by the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 
While in custody, Johnson was served with a Notice to Appear
and charged with removability “in that [he] was not in possession
of a valid unexpired immigrant Visa, reentry permit, border
crossing card, or valid entry document required by the
Immigration and Nationality Act.”  App. at 44.  The IJ deemed
Johnson “removable pursuant to the charge set forth in the
Notice to Appear.”  App. at 47.
About one month later, Johnson filed an application in the
Immigration Court for cancellation of removal under the Special
Rule for Battered Spouses.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2).1 
alien, the alien’s child, or the alien’s parent.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v) (2006).
2 Some decisions regarding relief are simply objective,
factual determinations, e.g., whether “the alien has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than
3 years,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(ii), or whether the alien has
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Thereafter, the Immigration Court had a hearing at which
Johnson testified in support of his application.  He testified that
his wife mistreated him by making baseless allegations against
him and depriving him of access to their two children.  Johnson
claimed that his wife’s actions amounted to extreme cruelty and
that if he is subject to removal, his children will suffer.
The IJ denied Johnson’s application for cancellation of
removal.  The BIA affirmed and dismissed Johnson’s appeal. 
Johnson then petitioned this court to review the BIA’s order.
II.
ANALYSIS
Johnson contends that “[t]he BIA has failed to meet its
statutory duty in reviewing the IJ’s decision.”  Pet’r’s Br. at 6. 
The IJ found that Johnson had not established that he was
battered by his wife, subjected to extreme cruelty by her, or that
his removal would result in extreme hardship to himself, his
children, or his wife.  The BIA affirmed the IJ on the ground that
Johnson “did not establish that he has been battered” by his wife. 
App. at 2.
Before reaching the merits of Johnson’s claims, we must
have jurisdiction to review the determinations of the IJ and BIA. 
Our jurisdiction is limited by section 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that “any judgment regarding
the granting of relief under . . . [8 U.S.C. § 1229b]” is not subject
to judicial review.  Courts have interpreted a “judgment” as a
discretionary decision.2  It is settled in this circuit that we lack
been “convicted of an aggravated felony,” id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv).
Courts have determined that these matters are reviewable as they
are not judgments regarding the granting of relief, i.e., they are
nondiscretionary.  See, e.g., Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 497 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) “only bars
review of actual discretionary decisions to grant or deny relief
under [§ 1229b]”); see also Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 204
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Non-discretionary actions . . . and purely legal
determinations . . . remain subject to judicial review.”).
3 The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue in a non-precedential
opinion.  Ramdane v. Mukasey, 296 F. App’x 440, 442 (6th Cir.
2008) (deciding that there is “no reason to believe that extreme
cruelty” determinations are reviewable but reaching the merits
nonetheless).
5
jurisdiction over discretionary decisions regarding the granting of
relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  See Mendez-Moranchel v.
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that
“[t]he determination of whether the alien has established the
requisite hardship is a quintessential discretionary judgment” and
not reviewable).  However, we may review “constitutional
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review . . . .” 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
In his brief, the Attorney General focuses on our lack of
jurisdiction to review the “inherently subjective and therefore
discretionary” decisions as to “extreme cruelty.”  Resp’t’s Br. at
5.  We have not yet decided whether an IJ’s determination that a
petitioner was subjected to “extreme cruelty” is a discretionary
decision.  Four of the five circuits that have addressed this
precise question have held that the extreme cruelty determination
is discretionary and not subject to judicial review.3  See
Stepanovic v. Filip, 554 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2009); Wilmore
v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006); Perales-
Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 982 (10th Cir. 2005); but
see Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 833–35 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the extreme cruelty determination is
nondiscretionary and therefore reviewable).
4Although the BIA characterized the IJ’s decision as finding
that Johnson “did not establish that he has been battered,” App. at
2, and did not mention the phrase “extreme cruelty,” we focus on
“extreme cruelty” because that and “extreme hardship” were the
essence of Johnson’s contentions in seeking cancellation of
removal.  He did not allege that his wife “battered” him, as that
term is defined under the common law.
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We agree with the majority.  Congress has not defined
“extreme cruelty”4 or provided a legal standard for determining
its existence for the purposes of § 1229b(b)(2).  However, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) promulgated a
regulation that defines “battery or extreme cruelty” as:
includ[ing], but . . . not limited to, being the victim of any
act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful
detention, which results or threatens to result in physical
or mental injury.  Psychological or sexual abuse or
exploitation, including rape, molestation, incest (if the
victim is a minor), or forced prostitution shall be
considered acts of violence.  Other abusive actions may
also be acts of violence under certain circumstances,
including acts that, in and of themselves, may not initially
appear violent but that are a part of an overall pattern of
violence.
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2006).
In its holding that the determination of extreme cruelty
was discretionary, which deprived it of jurisdiction to review a
cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(2), the Tenth Circuit
stated that the definition of “battery or extreme cruelty” requires
“consideration of many discretionary factors.”  Perales-
Cumpean, 429 F.3d at 984.  Of special importance to the Tenth
Circuit’s analysis was the language in the DHS regulation that
“battery or extreme cruelty includes, but is not limited to” and
“may . . . be acts of violence under certain circumstances,”
phrases which that court concluded provided “[c]onsiderable
discretion.”  Id.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that “[a]lthough the
7extreme cruelty definition provides some guidance . . . , it . . .
does not remove the discretion afforded by Congress.” Wilmore,
455 F.3d at 528.  Following that line of authority, the Seventh
Circuit found the matter discretionary, reasoning that the “IJ
must determine the facts of a particular case, make a judgment
call as to whether those facts constitute cruelty, and, if so,
whether the cruelty rises to . . . a level that it can . . . be described
as extreme.”  Stepanovic, 554 F.3d at 680.
These analyses are persuasive.  In this case, the IJ had to
determine whether the allegations Johnson’s wife made against
him in the divorce proceedings and in seeking a restraining order,
as well as her deprivation of Johnson’s access to his children,
amounted to extreme cruelty.  There is no objective standard by
which this can be determined.  “[A]n IJ does not determine
extreme cruelty by simply plugging facts into a formula or
applying an algorithm.”  Stepanovic, 554 F.3d at 680 (citation
omitted).  We also agree with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that
the term “extreme cruelty” is discretionary because it is “not self-
explanatory and . . . reasonable men could differ as to its
meaning.”  Wilmore, 455 F.3d at 527.
Johnson relies on Hernandez, where the Ninth Circuit
held that extreme cruelty is nondiscretionary because it is a
“measure of domestic violence that can . . . be assessed on the
basis of objective standards.”  345 F.3d at 834.  However, that
case analyzed an antecedent, albeit similar, statute that Congress
has since repealed.  One of the factors considered relevant by the
Ninth Circuit was that the “extreme hardship” determination (as
opposed to the extreme cruelty determination) was “specifically
committed to ‘the opinion of the Attorney General.’”  Id.  That
provision does not appear in the current statute.  Ultimately,
though, we find the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning less persuasive
than that of the Tenth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.
Rather than focusing on whether or not “extreme cruelty”
is a discretionary determination, Johnson seeks to cast his claims
in legal and constitutional terms.  As the Seventh Circuit stated,
“[a] petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that Congress
chose to remove simply by cloaking an . . . argument in
constitutional garb . . . .”  Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d
8679, 694 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).  That is exactly what Johnson seeks to do.  He cites no
law that would support his position that the BIA’s denial of his
motion implicates legal or constitutional principles.
Even were we to assume jurisdiction, we would not be
persuaded by Johnson’s claim that merely amounts to a
disagreement with the IJ’s conclusion that his wife’s treatment
did not amount to extreme cruelty.  We find nothing inadequate
about the BIA’s review of the IJ’s decision.
Lastly, Johnson contends that the BIA’s failure to address
the potential hardship to his children raises a “colorable question
of law.”  Pet’r’s Br. at 13.  This argument lacks merit.  As the
Attorney General notes, “the elements necessary to demonstrate
eligibility for cancellation [of removal] are conjunctive [such
that] . . . Johnson’s inability to demonstrate extreme cruelty
precludes him from” relief under the extreme hardship provision. 
Resp’t’s Br. at 20 n.7.  Once it found the IJ’s extreme cruelty
determination to be sound, no further review was warranted by
the BIA.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, we will dismiss the petition
for review for lack of jurisdiction.
